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 We Built This City: Public Participation in Land 
Use Decisions in Singapore 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee* 
This article considers the extent to which the legal framework for making land use 
decisions in Singapore allows for public participation. It examines the issue from two 
angles: the creation and preservation of the built environment, and the transient use of 
public space. The first angle is discussed primarily from a heritage law viewpoint, 
focusing on planning law, compulsory acquisition law, and the legal regime for creating 
national monuments. As for the second angle, the article looks at how the use of 
common spaces for assemblies and processions is regulated. The foregoing are 
examined in the context of Edward Soja’s assertion in Seeking Spatial Justice (2010) 
that the equitable distribution of resources, services and access in cities is an important 
right. 
GIVEN SINGAPORE’S diminutive geographical extent, the use of its land and the 
development of its built environment are extensively regulated through law. The 
Government has also put in place legal regimes limiting the transient use of public 
space for assemblies and processions, which appear to stem from a deep-seated 
concern about the possibility of outbreaks of public disorder. Nonetheless, as the city – 
which encompasses the whole of Singapore – is primarily for the people rather than 
the Government, it stands to reason that denizens of the city should have a say in the 
decisions made on their behalf by public authorities. 
This article considers the extent to which the legal framework for making land 
use decisions in Singapore allows for public participation, in the context of the 
assertion by US political geographer and urban planner Edward Soja that spatial 
justice – the equitable distribution of resources, services and access in cities – is an 
important right. Part I identifies key themes from Soja’s recent book on spatial justice. 
Part II then examines the issue from two angles: the creation and preservation of the 
built environment, and the transient use of public space. I will discuss the first angle 
primarily from a heritage law viewpoint, focusing on planning law, compulsory 
acquisition law, and the legal regime for creating national monuments. As for the 
second angle, the article looks at how the use of common spaces for assemblies and 
                                                   
*  LL.B. (Hons.) (Nat’l University of Singapore), LL.M. (U.C.L., Lond.), Ph.D. (B’ham); Advocate & 
Solicitor (Singapore), Solicitor (England & Wales); Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, 
Singapore Management University. I would like to thank Tan Dan Feng for inviting me to 
participate in this project looking at the pertinence of Edward Soja’s ideas in Southeast Asian 
milieux. Earlier versions of the article were presented at a symposium entitled Spatial Justice in 
Singapore organized by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of 
Singapore on 24 January 2013, and at the 10th Asian Law Institute Conference held in Bangalore, 
India, 23–24 May 2013. It is dedicated to the memory of Edward Soja (1940–2015). 
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processions is regulated. Where statutory schemes appear inadequate, judicial review 
in administrative and constitutional law is also considered. 
I. EDWARD SOJA’S THESIS IN SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE 
No précis of Edward Soja’s 2010 book Seeking Spatial Justice1 will properly do it 
justice, but for the purpose of this article I will attempt to pick out some key themes. 
Building on the work of philosophers and social theorists like Henri Lefebvre (1901–
1991) and David Harvey (born 1935), Soja highlights the importance of the city to 
societies today, noting that it is “a special space and place of social and economic 
advantage, a focal point for the workings of social power and hierarchy, and therefore 
a potent battleground for struggles seeking greater democracy, equality, and justice”.2 
This has particular resonance for Singapore, an archetypal city-state which, since the 
1950s, has been regarded as completely urbanized.3 
What, then, is spatial justice? In the introduction to his book, Soja declares that 
he will not “provide a simplified ‘cookbook’ definition… but allow its meaning to evolve 
and expand chapter by chapter”.4 It is closely linked to Lefebvre’s idea of a ‘right to the 
city’, which Harvey characterized as “not merely a right of access to what the property 
speculators and state planners define, but an active right to make the city different, to 
shape it more in accord with our heart’s desire, and to re-make ourselves thereby in a 
different image”.5 Lefebvre was of the view that urban life produces unequal power 
relations, which eventually lead to unjust distributions of social resources in the city. 
The right to the city corrects this imbalance by providing disadvantaged city dwellers 
with the basis upon which to call for “greater access to social power and valued 
resources”, the aim being to “gain greater control over the forces shaping urban space, 
in other words to reclaim democracy from those who have been using it to maintain 
their advantaged positions”.6 In Lefebvre’s words:7 
The right to the city… should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights of 
the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of multiple services. It would affirm, 
on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of 
their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to use of the center, a 
privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for workers, 
immigrants, the “marginal” and even for the “privileged”). 
In the French and Anglo-American traditions, justice and liberal democracy 
have been ‘legalized’ in the sense that they have become associated with human rights 
which are protected by the law, 8  at least to some extent. Soja recognizes the 
                                                   
1  Edward W[illiam] Soja, Seeking Spatial Justice (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010). 
2  Soja, “Building a Spatial Theory of Justice” in Seeking Spatial Justice, ibid., 67–110 at 96. 
3  World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision (UN Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/322) (New York, 
N.Y.: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 2012) at 
128, Table A.2 (providing the percentage of population at mid-year residing in urban areas), online: 
UN DESA <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/pdf/FINAL-FINAL_REPORT%20WUP2011_ 
Annextables_01Aug2012_Final.pdf> (last accessed: 4 January 2013; archived at <http://www. 
webcitation.org/6DOphYZaN>). 
4  Soja, “Introduction” in Seeking Spatial Justice, supra note 1, 1–11 at 6. 
5  David Harvey, “A Right to the City” (2003) 27(4) Int’l J. Urban & Regional Research 939–941 at 
941, cited in Soja, “Building a Spatial Theory of Justice”, ibid. at 94. 
6  Soja, ibid. at 96. 
7  Henri Lefebvre (Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth Lebas, eds. & transls.), Writings on Cities (Oxford; 
Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996) at 34, cited in Soja, ibid. at 99. 
8  Soja, ibid. at 75–76. 
Lee: We Built this City: Public Participation in Land Use Decisions in Singapore … 4 
 
importance of this development. As an example of spatial justice in action, he cites 
Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (the Bus Riders Union case),9 a class action suit by bus riders against Los 
Angeles’ Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) for violation of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,10 which prohibits government agencies that receive federal funds 
from acting in a discriminatory manner. The plaintiffs alleged that the MTA had 
neglected the transport needs of racial minorities and the poor while favouring more 
wealthy residents. The matter was settled prior to trial before the District Court of the 
Central District of California. The Court recorded a consent decree which required the 
MTA, over a ten-year period, to give the highest budget priority to improving the 
quality of the bus service and to guarantee equitable access to public mass transport.11 
Singapore, a former British colony, inherited a Westminster-style government 
which embodies representative democracy 12 and the English common law system. 
Like the United States, it has a written constitution which guarantees a number of 
fundamental liberties to the people. These include the rights to equality before the law 
and equal protection of the law.13 We will therefore consider if the US experience has 
any relevance for Singapore. At this juncture it should be pointed out that, 
unsurprisingly, the Constitution contains no mention of spatial justice. Thus, if it is 
asserted that spatial justice is a human right in Singapore and should be given effect 
as such, a court must find that it is an aspect of one of the fundamental liberties 
explicitly set out in the Constitution, such as the right to equality already mentioned, 
or perhaps the rights to life and personal liberty.14 
Nonetheless, I do not read Soja as asserting that spatial justice can only be 
vindicated through the law. Rather, he highlights the necessity of effecting change 
                                                   
9  Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, DC No. 
CV-94-05936-TJH (29 October 1996), Dist. Ct, Central Dist. (Cal., US). 
10  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (enacted 2 July 1964). 
11  Soja, “Prologue” in Seeking Spatial Justice, supra note 1, vii–xviii at vii–viii and x. Subsequently, 
the plaintiffs claimed that the MTA had not fulfilled its obligations under the consent decree. Since 
no agreement could be reached on the matter, a special master was appointed under the terms of 
the decree to give directions. The MTA appealed unsuccessfully against the master’s directions 
(Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, 263 
F. 3d 1041 (2001) (C.A.) (9th Cir. Cal., U.S.)), and the US Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal 
(Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Labor/Community Strategy Center 535 
US 951 (2002)). Prior to the consent decree’s expiry the plaintiffs applied to the District Court for 
an extension, again claiming that the MTA had not properly complied with it. The District Court 
refused an extension, and the refusal was upheld by the Court of Appeal of the Ninth Circuit on the 
ground that there had been substantial compliance with the decree by the MTA: Labor/Community 
Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority 564 F. 3d 1115 (2009) (C.A.) 
(9th Cir. Cal., US). 
12  The term representative democracy does not appear in the Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore (1985 Rev. Ed., 1999 Rep.) [Constitution], but in the Proclamation of Singapore 
contained in the Independence of Singapore Agreement 1965 (1985 Rev. Ed.) which was entered 
into by the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore to effect Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew proclaimed on behalf of the people and the Government that as from 
9 August 1965 “Singapore shall be forever a sovereign democratic and independent nation...”. The 
Government has on various occasions spoken of Singapore as a representative democracy: see, for 
example, Lee Hsien Loong (Prime Minister), “Parliamentary Elections (Motion)”, Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (27 August 2008), vol. 84, cols. 3328–3409. 
13  Constitution, ibid., Art. 12(1). 
14  Constitution, ibid., Art. 9(1). 
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through political processes as well, stressing the prime importance of grassroots and 
local community action in this regard.15 
II. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN LAND USE DECISIONS IN SINGAPORE 
I turn now to examine the legal framework in Singapore relating to land use decisions. 
These may be divided into laws relating to the structuring of the built environment, 
and laws governing the transient use of public space. Obviously, there are many laws 
that relate to the foregoing, so those described here should be seen as illustrative. Our 
concern is the extent to which regulations of this sort ensure spatial justice – how 
much of a voice they allow the city’s denizens. 
A. LAWS RELATING TO THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
1. Planning 
As Singapore has a land area of just 718.3 square kilometres,16 planned development 
of its built environment is essential. This was recognized from the founding of the 
modern settlement, with Sir Stamford Raffles conceptualizing the first town plan for 
the Singapore River’s environs and issuing instructions concerning it to a newly 
appointed Town Committee on 4 November 1822.17 Today, the accepted method of 
ensuring orderly development is to produce and regularly update a master plan, which 
is drawn up based on analyses of the nation’s physical, social, and economic 
conditions. 18  The first Master Plan was prepared by the Singapore Improvement 
Trust19 between 1952 and 1955 and approved by the Governor in Council on 5 August 
1958; it formed the basis for successive Master Plans. 20  On 1 February 1960, the 
Planning Act 195921 came into force, providing, among other things, for the Master 
Plan to be reviewed every five years22  by the “competent authority” charged with 
responsibility for implementing the Act, who is the Chief Planner of the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA).23 
                                                   
15  See generally Soja, “Seeking Spatial Justice in Los Angeles” in Seeking Spatial Justice, supra note 
1, 111–155. 
16  As of 2014: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Singapore in Figures 2015 (2015), online:  
Department of Statistics <https://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/publications/publications_and_papers/reference/sif2015.pdf> (accessed 14 October 
2015; archived at <https://perma.cc/R7KQ-4KSL>). 
17  Martin Perry, Lily Kong, and Brenda Yeoh, Singapore: A Developmental City State (Singapore: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1997) at 26, cited in Cai Yunci, “Law and its Impact on Singapore’s Built 
Heritage” in Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan and Michael Hor, eds., Encounters with Singapore Legal 
History: Essays in Memory of Geoffrey Wilson Bartholomew (Singapore: Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, 2009), 87–125 at 88. 
18  Tan Sook Yee, Tang Hang Wu, and Kelvin F[att] K[in] Low, “Planning and Development” in Tan 
Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law, 3rd ed. (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2009), 751–772 at 
751, para. 23.3. 
19  Under the provisions of Pt. IV of the Singapore Improvement Ordinance (Cap. 259, 1955 Ed.): see 
the Planning Act (Cap. 232, 1998 Rev. Ed.) [PA], s. 6. 
20  PA, ibid., s. 6. 
21  Planning Act 1959 (No. 12 of 1959), now the PA, supra note 19. 
22  Tan, Tang, and Low, supra note 18 at 752, para. 23.5. The relevant provision in the current Act is 
s. 8. 
23  Appointment of Competent Authority (Cap. 232, N 7, 2007 Rev. Ed.), para. 1(b). This notification 
also appoints as competent authorities the Chief Executive Officer of the Urban Redevelopment 
Authority (URA) to implement aspects of the Act other than revision of the Master Plan, and the 
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The Master Plan consists of information on how land may be used, approved 
maps, and a written statement that aids the interpretation of the Master Plan by 
summarizing the Master Plan’s main proposals and providing descriptive matter to 
illustrate the proposals. 24  The Master Plan 2014 is the current version, 25  and its 
written statement deals with matters such as zoning, plot ratios, and factors to be taken 
into account when approving development applications.26 Conservation is integral to 
the planning process, and the Minister for National Development is empowered to 
designate in the Master Plan “any area… of special architectural, historic, traditional 
or aesthetic interest” as a conservation area, which may comprise a whole area, a group 
of buildings, or even a single building. 27  The URA issues guidelines for the 
conservation of buildings or land within a conservation area and for the protection of 
their setting.28 
Each Master Plan guides medium-term development over ten to 15 years,29 and 
is regarded as an end product which is adhered to strictly in controlling development.30 
For longer term planning over a 40–50 year horizon and to guide the updating of 
Master Plans, the URA prepares Concept Plans aimed to “[ensure] there is sufficient 
land to meet long-term population and economic growth while providing a good 
quality living environment”. Reviewed every ten years, Concept Plans are not 
mandated by the Planning Act and are thus purely advisory.31 The URA commenced a 
review for the Concept Plan 2011 in January 2010.32 The process involved extensive 
public consultation, including a lifestyle survey33 and focus groups on “quality of life”34 
and “sustainability and identity”.35 
                                                   
Housing and Development Board (HDB) in respect of breaches of planning permission concerning 
its land: paras. 1(a) and (c). 
24  PA, supra note 19, s. 2 (definition of written statement) and s. 6. 
25  Available on the URA’s website at “URA Maps”, online: <https://www.ura.gov.sg/maps/> (last 
accessed: 5 November 2014). 
26  The Planning Act: Master Plan Written Statement 2014, online: URA <https://www.ura.gov.sg/ 
uol/~/media/User%20Defined/URA%20Online/master-plan/master-plan-2014/Written-
Statement-2014.ashx> (last accessed: 14 October 2015; archived at <https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20150907205501/https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/~/media/User%20Defined/URA%20 
Online/master-plan/master-plan-2014/Written-Statement-2014.ashx>). 
27  PA, supra note 19, s. 9. 
28  Ibid., s. 11(1). 
29  About Land Use Planning (Singapore: URA, 2010), online: URA <http://www.ura.gov.sg/land_ 
use_planning/> (last accessed: 5 January 2013; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/ 
6DRmw36Gs>). 
30  Leung Yew Kwong, Development Land and Development Change in Singapore (Singapore: 
Butterworths, 1987) at 15–17 and 22–23, cited in Tan, Tang, and Low, supra note 18 at 753, para. 
23.6. 
31  Tan, Tang, and Low, supra note 18 at 753, para. 23.8. 
32  URA, “Concept Plan Review 2011: Planning for a Sustainable Singapore”, online: URA <http:// 
spring.ura.gov.sg/conceptplan2011/index.cfm> (last accessed: 6 January 2013; archived at 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20100202222744/http://spring.ura.gov.sg/conceptplan2011/ind
ex.cfm>). 
33  URA, URA Lifestyle Survey 2009 (Singapore: URA, 2010), online: URA <http://spring.ura.gov. 
sg/conceptplan2011/results/Report%20-%20Lifestyle%20Survey%20and%20Online%20Survey
.pdf> (last accessed: 6 January 2013; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/6DRqZ0Mb1>). 
34  URA, Final Report of Focus Group on Quality of Life (Singapore: URA, 2010), online: URA 
<http://spring.ura.gov.sg/conceptplan2011/results/FGC_CPR-Quality_of_Life_FA.pdf> (last 
accessed: 6 January 2013; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/6DRrvqjvF>). 
35  URA, Final Report of Focus Group on Sustainability and Identity (Singapore: URA, 2010), online: 
URA <http://spring.ura.gov.sg/conceptplan2011/results/FGC_CPR-Sustainability_and_ 
Identity_FA.pdf> (last accessed: 6 January 2013; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/ 
6DRraLzbJ>). 
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Amendments to a Master Plan must be proposed by the URA and approved by 
the Minister.36  A proposal for a material 37  amendment must be advertised in the 
Government Gazette and in one English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil newspaper 
circulating in Singapore specifying a period of not less than two weeks within which 
the public may make objections and representations concerning it.38 The Minister is 
required to give any objectors or representors an opportunity to appear before a 
hearing or public inquiry, and to take into account such objections and representations 
and the findings of the hearing or public inquiry when deciding whether to approve or 
reject the proposal.39 Therefore, at least in theory the processes and legal procedures 
for keeping Concept Plans and Master Plans up to date arguably promote spatial 
justice. 
However an unexpected incident has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 
Master Plan amendment procedure. In September 2011, the Government announced 
that it would be building a road across two adjoining historic cemeteries, Bukit Brown 
Cemetery and Seh Ong Cemetery, in order to alleviate traffic congestion in the area.40 
Together, these two cemeteries form part of what is believed to be the largest Chinese 
cemetery outside China.41 Although exhumation works began in October 2013,42 the 
road only appeared on the URA’s Draft Master Plan 2013 launched on 20 November.43 
The Singapore Heritage Society (SHS) and members of the All Things Bukit Brown 
and SOS Bukit Brown civil society communities submitted objections to the proposal 
to amend the Master Plan to include the road. 44  In addition, the Nature Society 
                                                   
36  PA, supra note 19, s. 8. 
37  Under the Planning (Master Plan) Rules (Cap. 232, R 1, 2000 Rev. Ed.) [PMPR], r. 6(3), non-
material amendments may be made without complying with the procedure described in the text. 
38  PMPR, ibid., r. 2 (definition of notice by advertisement) and r. 4. 
39  PMPR, ibid., r. 6. 
40  Land Transport Authority, URA, and National Parks Board, “Construction of New Dual Four-lane 
Road to Relieve Congestion along PIE & Lornie Road and Serve Future Developments”, Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (12 September 2011), online: URA <http://www.ura.gov.sg/pr/text/ 
2011/pr11-109.html> (last accessed: 13 January 2014; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140108063907/http:/www.ura.gov.sg/pr/text/2011/pr11-109.html>). 
41  Terence Chong, “Bukit Brown as Contested Space” in Position Paper on Bukit Brown (Singapore: 
Singapore Heritage Society, 2012) at 20–24, online: Singapore Heritage Society 
<http://www.singaporeheritage.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/SHS_BB_Position_Paper. 
pdf> (last accessed: 27 February 2013; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20121022225529/http:/www.singaporeheritage.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/SHS_BB_ 
Position_Paper.pdf>). 
42  Siau Ming En, “Exhumation of Bukit Brown Graves to Start in Oct” Today (6 August 2013), online: 
<http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/exhumation-bukit-brown-graves-start-oct> (last 
accessed: 10 January 2014; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/20130908074635/http:/ 
www.todayonline.com/singapore/exhumation-bukit-brown-graves-start-oct>). 
43  URA, Our Future, Our Home. Draft Master Plan 2013 Exhibition at URA (20 November 2013), 
online: URA <http://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/media-room/news/2013/nov/pr13-75.aspx> (last 
accessed: 8 November 2014; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/20140716233702/http:// 
www.ura.gov.sg/uol/media-room/news/2013/nov/pr13-75.aspx>). 
44  Singapore Heritage Society, Singapore Heritage Society’s letter to MND on Draft Master Plan 2013 
(18 December 2013), online: Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/notes/singapore-heritage-
society/singapore-heritage-societys-letter-to-mnd-on-draft-master-plan-2013-18-dec-2013/ 
611710158876624> (last accessed: 11 January 2014; archived at <http://perma.cc/RPL8-U3Z2>); 
Ian Chong, “How You Can Give Feedback on Bukit Brown in the Draft Master Plan 2013”, All Things 
Bukit Brown (3 December 2013), online: All Things Bukit Brown <http://bukitbrown.com/ 
main/?p=8420> (last accessed: 11 January 2014; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140111151432/http:/bukitbrown.com/main/?p=8420>); “Your Feedback to MND”, All Things 
Bukit Brown (12 December 2013), online: All Things Bukit Brown <http://bukitbrown.com/ 
main/?p=8459> (last accessed: 11 January 2014; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/ 
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(Singapore) (NSS) sent in an extensive report commenting on many issues of 
environmental concern relating to the Draft Master Plan, including conservation of the 
marine environment, swamps, and primary and secondary forests; the encroachment 
of development on nature areas; and the importance of environmental impact 
assessments. 45  On Bukit Brown Cemetery, the Society referred to its earlier 
conservation proposal on the matter,46 and stressed that the cemetery is an “important 
wildlife habitat” which provides a nesting ground, especially for birds. Surveys it had 
conducted revealed the presence of endangered species of birds and mammals.47 
About six months later a number of the representors, including the SHS and 
members of SOS Bukit Brown,48 received the same standard-form letter dated 5 June 
2014 from the Ministry of National Development (MND) stating that “the conservation 
of Singapore’s heritage is factored in our land use plans… [b]ut there will be occasions 
when trade-offs will need to be made in our land use decisions”. The letter noted that 
the justifications for the road “have been presented and debated in Parliament. The 
final road alignment was determined with inputs from agencies, such as the National 
Parks Board on biodiversity and the Public Utilities Board on drainage in the area.”49 
The next day, 6 June, the Master Plan 2014 was gazetted without any hearing or public 
inquiry having been conducted in relation to these representations.50 
The URA gave a similar response to the NSS’s view in its December 2013 report 
that the Master Plan’s commitment to protecting biodiversity was “embarrassingly 
negligible” because by 2030 only 4.4 percent of Singapore’s land area – a “shocking 
niggardly contribution” – would be put to such use. This figure excluded reservoirs 
                                                   
20140111151816/http://bukitbrown.com/main/?p=8459>); SOS Bukit Brown, Gazetting the Land 
Use Master Plan 2014 – Did MND and URA Just Ignore the Law? (3 July 2014), online: Facebook 
<https://www.facebook.com/notes/sos-bukit-brown/gazetting-the-land-use-master-plan-
2014did-mnd-and-ura-just-ignore-the-law/664480653634266> (last accessed: 6 August 2014; 
archived at <http://perma.cc/EQ96-7NX9?type=image>). 
45  Nature Society (Singapore) Conservation Committee, Feedback on the Updated URA Master Plan 
(November 2013) (19 December 2013), online: <http://www.nss.org.sg/documents/ 
Nature%20Society%C2%B9s%20Feedback%20on%20the%20Updated%20URA%20Master%20
Plan.pdf> (last accessed: 10 August 2015; archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20150327050735/http://nss.org.sg/documents/Nature%20Society%C2%B9s%20Feedback%20 
on%20the%20Updated%20URA%20Master%20Plan.pdf>) [NSS, Feedback]. 
46  Nature Society (Singapore), Nature Society (Singapore)’s Response to the Bukit Brown 
Expressway Plan (23 March 2012), online: <http://www.nss.org.sg/documents/BB_Response_ 
HHC_AS_CL_v3-9.260312.pdf> (last accessed: 10 August 2015; archived at <https://web.archive. 
org/web/20140110103740/http://www.nss.org.sg/documents/BB_Response_HHC_AS_CL_v3
-9.260312.pdf>), which was an addendum to its original paper Nature Society (Singapore)’s 
Position on Bukit Brown (12 December 2011), online: <http://www.nss.org.sg/documents/ 
Nature%20Society%27s%20Position%20on%20Bukit%20Brown.pdf> (last accessed: 10 August 
2015; archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20150524175050/http://www.nss.org.sg/ 
documents/Nature%20Society%27s%20Position%20on%20Bukit%20Brown.pdf>). 
47  NSS, Response to Plan, supra note 46 at 13. 
48  SOS Bukit Brown, Gazetting the Land Use Master Plan 2014, ibid.; Andrew Loh, “Did URA & MND 
contravene law on Master Plan?”, The Online Citizen (3 July 2014), online: The Online Citizen 
<http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2014/07/did-ura-mnd-contravene-law-on-master-plan/> 
(last accessed: 6 August 2014; archived at <http://perma.cc/9RXC-H59A>). 
49  The text of the letter was posted on All Things Bukit Brown’s Facebook page Heritage Singapore –  
Bukit Brown Cemetery by one A. J. Leow at <https://www.facebook.com/groups/bukitbrown/ 
permalink/659660330770851/> (last accessed: 6 August 2014). 
50  URA gazettes Master Plan 2014, Urban Redevelopment Authority (6 June 2014), online: URA 
<http://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/media-room/news/2014/jun/pr14-33.aspx> (last accessed: 6 
August 2014; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/20140702202413/http:/www.ura.gov. 
sg/uol/media-room/news/2014/jun/pr14-33.aspx>). 
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and ‘nature areas’ which are only kept intact while not required for development.51 In 
comparison, Target 11 of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets adopted pursuant to the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 52  which Singapore ratified in 1995, 
states:53 
By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas, and 10 per cent of 
coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, 
ecologically representative and well connected systems of protected areas and other 
effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes 
and seascapes. 
In reply, the URA noted that: 
[l]and is a scarce resource in Singapore, and drafting the Master Plan for land use 
requires a balanced accommodation of the many competing needs that Singapore has, 
both as a country and as a city… . Above all, we need to ensure that the fundamental 
and basic needs of our citizens are met first. 
Given these constraints, when assessing the land areas involved in protecting 
Singapore’s biodiversity the Authority justified taking into account nature areas 
potentially subject to future development, man-made parks and park connectors, 
roadside plants, sky-rise greenery, and forested defence training areas.54 
For a parliamentary sitting the following month on 9 July, Nominated Member 
of Parliament Eugene Tan filed the following questions:55 
To ask the Minister for National Development (a) if he can provide a summary of the 
feedback, objections and representations received on the Draft Master Plan 2013; (b) 
whether hearings or public inquiries have been held prior to the gazetting of the Master 
Plan 2014 on 6 June 2014; and (c) if not, whether there are any plans to hold such 
hearings and public inquiries. 
The Minister, Khaw Boon Wan, provided a written response. Among other 
things, he said: 
We conducted one hearing where the feedback raised new matters which were 
substantive, which we required further clarifications on and which pertained to a new 
                                                   
51  Feedback on the Updated URA Master Plan (November 2013), supra note 45 at 4; Feng Zengkun, 
“Nature Society Slams Land-use Plan: URA’s Commitment to Conservation Negligible, It Says”, The 
Straits Times (8 January 2014) at B5. 
52  1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992). 
53  Conference of the Parties, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 (COP 10 Decision X/2), 
Annex, online: <https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12268> (last accessed: 11 August 2015; 
archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20150620121957/https://www.cbd.int/decision/ 
cop/?id=12268>). 
54  Hwang Yu Ning (Group Director (Physical Planning), URA), “Parks, Nature Reserves Important: 
URA”, The Straits Times (11 January 2014), online: <http://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/media-
room/forum-replies/2014/jan/forum14-01.aspx> (last accessed: 11 August 2015; archived at 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20140705153419/http://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/media-
room/forum-replies/2014/jan/forum14-01.aspx>); and see Feng Zengkun, “URA Defends 
Biodiversity Commitment”, The Straits Times (11 January 2014). 
55  “Feedback and Objections Received for Draft Master Plan 2013”, Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, Official Report (9 July 2014), vol. 92, no column numbers assigned yet; see also Ministry 
of National Development, Written Answer by Ministry of National Development on Draft Master 
Plan 2013 (9 July 2014), online: Ministry of National Development <http://app.mnd.gov.sg/ 
Newsroom/NewsPage.aspx?ID=5483> (last accessed: 6 August 2014; archived at <http://perma. 
cc/36A5-YXDU>). 
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proposal in the Master Plan. With the gazette of the Master Plan, the Draft Master Plan 
process has been completed.56 
The MND’s response to the objections to the Draft Master Plan, and the Minister’s 
assertion that a hearing can be dispensed with if matters that are not “new” and 
“substantive” are raised, are surprising as they seem to fly in the face of the relevant 
legislation, the Planning (Master Plan) Rules,57 which expressly require a hearing 
unless the objections or representations received are frivolous.58 The courts had no 
opportunity to rule on whether the MND had interpreted the Rules correctly as no 
representor commenced judicial review proceedings to challenge the Minister’s 
decision not to convene a hearing or public inquiry. 
This incident highlights two weaknesses of the Master Plan amendment 
procedure which undermine its utility in ensuring public participation in the process. 
First, drastic changes to the land can be planned and executed without a prior 
amendment to the Master Plan. Secondly, based on the manner the MND currently 
interprets the law, it is not a given that a hearing will be held to allow for public 
consultation on proposed changes to the Master Plan. In addition, it should be noted 
that the URA may prepare certified interpretation plans on a scale larger than the 
maps in the Master Plan to provide more detailed interpretation of the latter.59 Such 
plans require no approval by the Minister, and there is no statutory procedure for 
members of the public to make representations regarding them. 
Suffering from a similar shortcoming is the procedure for obtaining approval to 
develop land60 (planning permission) and to carry out works within a conservation 
area61 (conservation permission).62 Applications are generally dealt with by the URA,63 
though the Minister may direct the Authority to refer specific applications or a class of 
applications to him.64 In general, applications must be decided in conformity with the 
Master Plan and any relevant certified interpretation plan, 65  unless the Minister 
approves otherwise in certain circumstances detailed in section 14(2) of the Planning 
Act. It is clear that works requiring planning or conservation permission can have a 
significant impact on people living or working in the vicinity of the site in question, 
and perhaps further afield as well. For instance, a material change in the use of a 
building requires permission, and one can well imagine that if the owner of a building 
sought permission for it to be modified from a residence to commercial premises, 
owners and occupants of neighbouring buildings might have something to say about 
whether permission should be granted. Nonetheless, the Act is silent on the matter. 
                                                   
56  Ibid. 
57  Supra note 37. 
58  PMPR, ibid., r. 6(1). 
59  PA, supra note 19, s. 7. 
60  The term development is defined compendiously in the PA, ibid., s. 3. 
61  The term works within a conservation area extends beyond development of land within a 
conservation area to “any decorative, painting, renovation or other works (whether external or 
internal) to any building within a conservation area which may affect its character or appearance”: 
PA, ibid., s. 2. 
62  The approval is required by the PA, ibid., s. 12, which also mandates that the URA’s permission be 
sought before land is subdivided. Carrying out works without permission is an offence punishable 
by a fine not exceeding $200,000 and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not 
exceeding $10,000 for every day or part thereof during which the offence continues after conviction: 
s. 12(4). In addition, a convicted offender may be ordered to remove from the land property and 
materials used in connection with the offence: s. 12(5). 
63  PA, ibid., s. 13. 
64  PA, ibid., s. 21. 
65  PA, ibid., s. 14(1). 
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This means an aggrieved person must attempt to seek a remedy either on the 
basis of administrative law rules articulated by courts over time as part of the common 
law, or the Constitution.66 As regards administrative law, since exercises of power by 
the URA and the Minister under the Act spring from a legal source and serve public 
functions, they are amenable to judicial review by the High Court.67 Judicial review of 
administrative action is the means by which the Court asserts jurisdiction to supervise 
public authorities;68  the Court may, for instance, issue a quashing order to quash 
actions and decisions taken by authorities in breach of administrative law, a 
prohibiting order to prevent them from acting contrary to administrative law rules, 
and/or a mandatory order to direct that they reconsider matters in light of the correct 
rules. These are known as prerogative orders. However, people potentially affected by 
development work only remotely – for example, those who feel a new building will 
blight the landscape and thus wish to contest any planning permission for it, but who 
do not live near the proposed site – may have difficulty showing they have sufficient 
standing to apply for judicial review. This is examined in Part II.A.3 below. 
In addition, the Court’s role in administrative law is circumscribed, as Justice 
V. K. Rajah noted in Wong Keng Leong Rayney v. Law Society of Singapore:69 
Judicial review is almost invariably limited to examining, inter alia, whether the 
tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, whether there has been an abuse of discretion or 
a failure of natural justice, and whether the tribunal has acted irrationally, 
unreasonably or in bad faith. In other words, it hinges on the legality of the decision. … 
[T]he reviewing court cannot substitute its decision for that of the administrative body 
under review. This is because the task of determining the rights of the parties has been 
statutorily conferred on the administrative body, not the court. The reviewing court 
may declare that the task has been performed badly in law but it cannot take the further 
step of actually performing the task itself. 
To my knowledge, there are no reported cases involving a challenge by a third 
party against development work being approved. A 2009 case with different facts, 
Borissik v. Urban Redevelopment Authority,70 illustrates how difficult it is for such a 
claim to succeed. In the case, the applicant took out judicial review proceedings against 
the URA because the Authority had declined to approve renovation works which she 
and her husband wished to carry out on their home. The High Court dismissed the 
application, holding that, among other things, the applicant had failed to prove the 
URA had taken into account extraneous objectives, behaved irrationally, or made any 
representation to the applicant giving rise to a legitimate expectation that permission 
to execute the works would be given. Since the URA had not acted in breach of any 
administrative law rule, it was not for the Court to determine whether the works should 
have been approved or not – that was a decision for the Authority alone. 
Let us assume that the URA has approved an application to build a Mass Rapid 
Transit (MRT) station in a location that some people find difficult to access. Might an 
aggrieved person bring a case against the Authority alleging that he or she has been 
discriminated against, in the manner that the plaintiffs in the Bus Riders Union case 
                                                   
66  Supra note 13. 
67  UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong Town Corporation [2011] 3 S.L.R. [Singapore Law 
Reports] 94 at 109–114, paras. 48–61 (H.C.); Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities 
Trading Ltd. [2012] 3 S.L.R. 565 at 569–577, paras. 4–28 (H.C.). 
68  Ng Chye Huey v. Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 S.L.R.(R.) [Singapore Law Reports (Reissue)] 106 
(C.A.). 
69  [2006] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 934 (H.C.). See also Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading 
Ltd. [2012] 3 S.L.R. 565 at 569, para. 3 (H.C.). 
70  Borissik v. Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 92 (H.C.). 
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did?71 There is no anti-discrimination legislation in Singapore akin to Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, so a judicial review application might have to be brought 
alleging a breach of Article 12(1) of the Constitution, which states: “All persons are 
equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.” Current case law 
indicates that the courts apply a legal test to Article 12(1) which is highly deferential to 
the executive and legislative branches of government. In order to establish that Article 
12(1) has been infringed, an applicant must show that he or she belongs to a class of 
persons that has been treated differently from one or more comparable classes; and 
that either his or her class has not been clearly defined, or there is no rational relation 
between the class and the object of the law.72 Most cases are likely to turn on the 
rational relation limb of the test, which is not difficult for the Government to satisfy as 
a mere rationality standard is applied, particularly as the Court of Appeal has said that 
an applicant must rebut a “strong presumption of constitutionality” 73  in order to 
succeed. For example, if the URA can show that its approval for the construction of an 
MRT station in a particular place is not irrational but based on certain grounds such 
as the transportation needs of people living in the vicinity, then its decision cannot be 
regarded as violating Article 12(1). Indeed, in the recent decision of Lim Meng Suang 
v. Attorney-General,74 the Court of Appeal expressed the view that: 
[a]lthough the absence of such a rational relation can take many forms, it seems to us 
that the requisite rational relation will – more often than not – be found. This is 
because… there is no need for a perfect relation or ‘complete coincidence’ [emphasis 
added] between the differentia in question and the purpose and object of the statute 
concerned. … [T]he relation need only be a rational one.75 
Eng Foong Ho v. Attorney-General76 involved a claim by devotees of a temple 
espousing Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist beliefs that the Collector of Land Revenue 
had violated Article 12(1) by compulsorily acquiring the land on which the temple 
stood pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act,77 but leaving nearby land belonging to a 
Christian church and a Hindu mission untouched. The reason provided for the 
acquisition was the construction and comprehensive redevelopment of the MRT’s 
Circle Line. The Court of Appeal noted that the appellants had conceded that the 
Collector had acted in good faith and had not adduced any evidence of arbitrary action 
on the Collector’s part.78 It found that the Collector’s decision had been “based solely 
on planning considerations”. 79  There had been no “intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination” 80  by the Collector. This stringent standard is favourable to the 
Government, and hence not easy for an applicant to establish. 
I referred earlier to the possibility that spatial justice might be an aspect of 
article 9(1) of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law”. This approach has been ruled 
out, at least for the time being, by the Court of Appeal. In Lim Meng Suang, the Court 
                                                   
71  Supra note 9. 
72  Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 489 at 507–508, para. 58 (C.A.); Lim 
Meng Suang v. Attorney-General [2015] 1 S.L.R. 26 at 48, para. 60 (C.A.). 
73  Taw Cheng Kong, ibid. at 509, para. 60; see also Lim Meng Suang, ibid. at para. 4. 
74  Supra note 72. 
75  Ibid. at para. 68 (emphasis original). 
76  Eng Foong Ho v. Attorney-General [2009] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 542 (C.A.) [Eng Foong Ho]. 
77  Land Acquisition Act (Cap. 152, 1985 Rev. Ed.) [LAA]. 
78  Eng Foong Ho, supra note 76 at 553, para. 31. 
79  Ibid. at 555, para. 35. 
80  Ibid. at 553, para. 30. 
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said that personal liberty in the article “refers only to the personal liberty of a person 
from unlawful incarceration or detention”, and that “[a]lthough the phrase ‘life’ has 
not been authoritatively interpreted by the Singapore courts, it should be interpreted 
narrowly in accordance with the jurisprudence on ‘personal liberty’ and Art 9’s context 
and structure”.81 It is worth noting, though, that the High Court case82 relied on by the 
Court of Appeal for this narrow definition of personal liberty cited no authority for it. 
It is thus conceivable that the Court of Appeal might be persuaded to adopt a more 
expansive interpretation of the terms life and personal liberty in a future case, perhaps 
along the lines of the Malaysian Court of Appeal’s judgment in Tan Tek Seng v. 
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan.83 There, it was held that the word life in 
Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, which is identical to Singapore’s 
Article 9(1), includes elements that form the quality of life including, for instance, the 
right to live in a reasonably healthy and pollution-free environment.84 It is easy to see 
how a right to the city might be encompassed within such a broadly interpreted right 
to life. Unfortunately, it does not seem that such an approach will be embraced by the 
Singapore courts any time soon. 
Under administrative and constitutional law in Singapore as it currently stands, 
people may be put off by the difficulty and cost of seeking judicial review of a grant of 
planning or conservation permission. Given that Parliament has seen fit to lay down a 
procedure enabling objections and representations to be made about proposals to 
amend the Master Plan, it is submitted that a similar procedure should be introduced 
for applications for development work as well. One may wonder why such a procedure 
was not introduced in the first place. Perhaps there was a concern that development 
would be bogged down by unmeritorious objections to applications. In recent years, 
there have been instances of people objecting to plans to site childcare centres, foreign 
workers’ dormitories and nursing homes near their residences, which has been 
condemned as evidence that an undesirable “not in my backyard” attitude is 
spreading.85 On the other hand, when an objection or representation to a proposed 
amendment to the Master Plan has been made, the Minister need not convene a 
hearing or public inquiry if he or she deems the objection or representation frivolous.86 
There is no reason why a similar power cannot be conferred on the authority 
responsible for approving development applications. To ensure the decision-making 
process is evidence-based and transparent, the procedure must be effective – its utility 
                                                   
81  Lim Meng Suang, supra note 72 at para. 45. 
82  Lo Pui Sang v. Mamata Kapildev Dave [2008] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 754 at 760, para. 6 (H.C.). In Lim Meng 
Suang, the Court of Appeal additionally cited its previous decision Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-
General [2012] 4 S.L.R. 476 at 524, para. 120, which had also cited Lo Pui Sang. 
83  Tan Teck Seng v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 M.L.J. 261 (C.A.). 
84  Tan Tek Seng, ibid. at 288. 
85  See, for example, Melissa Sim, “Foreign Workers? Not in My Backyard” The Straits Times (3 
September 2008) at 25; Chua Lee Hoong, “Power, Pride and Prejudice” The Straits Times (6 
September 2008) at 2; Lin Yanqin, “A Dangerous Divide; Mah: Stop Demonising Workers, 
Residents and Start Accepting Them” Today (18 September 2014) at 1; Cheryl Ong and Shuli 
Sudderuddin, “‘Not in My Backyard’ Attitude: How MPs Handle It” The Straits Times (9 February 
2012); Huang Shoou Chyuan, Letter, “Work Together against Parochial Reactions” Today (11 
February 2012) at 10; Goh Sui Noi, “So in Whose Backyard, Then?” The Straits Times (23 February 
2012); Li Xueying, “PM Lee Flags Two Worries” The Straits Times (5 April 2012) (“Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong yesterday identified two worrying trends he sees in Singapore, warning that they 
stand in the way of a cohesive community. … [One is] people saying ‘no’ to having public facilities 
in their neighbourhoods, or what has been dubbed the Not In My Backyard, or Nimby, syndrome”); 
Editorial, “Malaise of Squabbles over Spaces” The Straits Times (9 June 2012). 
86  PMPR, supra note 37, r. 6(1). 
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is diminished if representations can be dismissed without an inquiry at the authorities’ 
discretion. 
2. Compulsory Acquisition of Land 
Singapore has had legislation enabling the Government to compulsorily acquire land 
held in private hands since the 19th century.87 The justification for such legislation is 
that the Government must have the ability to acquire private lands for the public good 
without creating too much of a financial burden on the public purse.88 Hence, until 
2007, the compensation payable by the Government was the value of the land at the 
date when it was gazetted for acquisition or at a date specified in the Land Acquisition 
Act,89 whichever was lower. As the statutory dates were only revised at intervals of 
several years, most of the time the Government only needed to pay a lower sum for 
property that had risen in price. The widest disparity was between 1973 and 1986, 
when the statutory date was not revised for 13 years. Subsequently, the date was 
revised after six-year and three-year intervals. With effect from 12 February 2007, the 
Act was amended to peg the rate of compensation at the market value which a willing 
purchaser would pay for the land as at the date of gazetting.90 
To acquire land compulsorily, the President, acting on the advice of the Cabinet 
or the Minister for National Development,91 publishes a notice in the Gazette declaring 
that the land is required for a public purpose; by any person, corporation, or statutory 
board for any work or undertaking which “in the opinion of the Minister, is of public 
benefit or of public utility or in the public interest”; or for residential, commercial, or 
industrial purposes.92 The Act states that such a notification is conclusive evidence 
that the land is required for the specified purpose,93 which means that the court is 
required to regard that fact as proved and cannot permit evidence to be given to 
disprove it.94 There is no statutory procedure for interested persons to challenge the 
necessity for the acquisition. 95  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal has held that an 
acquisition may be challenged in the courts on the ground that it has been carried out 
in bad faith, for instance, if land was acquired for a specified purpose but nothing has 
been done for a long time to effect the purpose and the Government provides no proper 
explanation for its inaction. 96  However, it is not possible to oppose compulsory 
acquisition of land on the basis that it violates a right to property. No such right exists 
in the Constitution, and since the Government intentionally omitted such a provision 
from the Constitution when Singapore gained full independence from Malaysia in 1965 
in order to ensure that the constitutionality of the Land Acquisition Act and 
                                                   
87  For a history of land acquisition legislation in Singapore, see generally Bryan Chew et al., 
“Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Singapore: A Fair Regime?” (2010) 22 Sing. Acad. L.J. 166 at 
168–170, paras. 5–11. 
88  Ibid. at 167, para. 3. 
89  Supra note 77. 
90  Chew et al., supra note 87 at 170–173, paras. 12–21. 
91  Constitution, supra note 12, Art. 21(1). 
92  LAA, supra note 77, s. 5(1). 
93  Ibid., s. 5(3). 
94  Evidence Act (Cap. 97, 1997 Rev. Ed.), s. 4(3). 
95  Tan, Tang, and Low, supra note 18 at 761, para. 23.32. 
96  Teng Fuh Holdings Pte. Ltd. v. Collector of Land Revenue [2007] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 568 at 575–578, 
paras. 24–41 (C.A.). 
Lee: We Built this City: Public Participation in Land Use Decisions in Singapore … 15 
 
acquisitions made pursuant to it,97 it would not be appropriate for the court to infer 
the existence of this right from the constitutional text. 
The legal means available for challenging the compulsory acquisition of land 
are therefore limited, but this is in line with the objective behind the legislation. There 
is no doubt that the Act wrought hardship in some past cases because of the low level 
of compensation the Government was required to pay; this was sometimes 
ameliorated through additional ex gratia payments and payments to cover removal 
and relocation expenses.98 Now that the Government must pay compensation at the 
market rate, this aspect of unfairness has been removed. In any case, given the scarcity 
of land in Singapore, large-scale infrastructural works such as public housing, the MRT 
network and expressways would not have been achievable without the Act. 
3. Preservation of Monuments 
An application for conservation permission is required if development works are 
sought to be made with regard to national monuments,99 and when deciding whether 
permission should be granted the URA will take into account any conservation 
guidelines relating to monuments that have been issued by the National Heritage 
Board (NHB). 100  The power of the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth, 
following consultation with the NHB, to declare sites as national monuments101 thus 
impacts the built environment as it may restrict the extent to which development can 
occur. At the same time, people interested in ensuring that buildings and sites of 
heritage value are preserved may feel aggrieved if the Minister decides not to make 
preservation orders in respect of them. 
The scheme for preservation of national monuments is laid out in the 
Preservation of Monuments Act,102 a statute dating back to 1970. As of 7 August 2015, 
there were 70 national monuments.103 Before the Minister issues a preservation order 
in respect of a monument, 104  the NHB is bound to give notice of the Minister’s 
intention to do so to “the owner and occupier of the monument and any land adjacent 
                                                   
97  Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No. 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev. Ed.), s. 6(3) (“The following 
provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia shall cease to have effect in Singapore: … Article 13…”); 
Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister), speech during the Second Reading of the Constitution 
(Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 December 1965), vol. 24, 
cols. 435–436. 
98  Chew et al., supra note 87 at 176–178, para. 26–31. 
99  Master Plan Written Statement 2014, supra note 26 at para. 1.1.3(ii). 
100  Ibid. at para. 10.1(i)(b). Such guidelines are issued pursuant to the Preservation of Monuments Act 
(Cap. 239, 2011 Rev. Ed.) [PMA], s. 4(c). 
101  PMA, ibid., s. 11. 
102  Supra note 100. 
103  National Heritage Board, National Monuments ([7 August 2015]), online: National Heritage Board 
<http://www.nhb.gov.sg/places/sites-and-monuments/national-monuments> (last accessed: 11 
August 2015; archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20150914161725/http://www.nhb.gov. 
sg/places/sites-and-monuments/national-monuments>). 
104  Monument is defined in the PMA, supra note 100, s. 2, as “the whole or any part of, or the remains 
of — (a) any building, structure, erection, statue, sculpture or other work, whether above or below 
the surface of the land, and any cave or excavation; (b) any site comprising the remains of any such 
building, structure, erection, statue, sculpture or other work or of any cave or excavation; or (c) any 
site comprising, or comprising the remains of, any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other movable 
structure or part thereof which neither constitutes nor forms part of any work which is a monument 
within paragraph (a), and includes any machinery attached to or forming part of a monument which 
cannot be detached from the monument without being dismantled”. A national monument is “any 
monument that is subject to a preservation order and includes any land containing or adjacent to 
such monument that is specified in the preservation order”: ibid. 
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thereto which will be affected” by the making of the order, giving such persons a 
reasonable period within which to submit any objections to the NHB. The Board must 
consider the objections and make recommendations on them to the Minister.105 The 
same procedure applies when a preservation order is sought to be amended or 
revoked.106 Given the wording of the relevant provisions of the Act, a person owning 
or occupying land adjacent to a monument that will be affected by the making, 
amendment or revocation of a preservation order is entitled to rely on the statutory 
procedure; a person who lives further afield may not. The procedure is also 
inapplicable where the Minister has not manifested any intention to issue or alter a 
preservation order, for instance, if people wish to call for a particular site to be declared 
a national monument. 
Once again, a person in this position would have to initiate proceedings for 
judicial review of the Minister’s decision to make a preservation order or to decline to 
do so. Apart from the difficulty of establishing that the Minister has acted contrary to 
administrative law rules, which was discussed earlier, another potential complication 
is whether the person can demonstrate that he or she has sufficient standing to bring 
a case against the Minister. This is a pertinent problem where monuments are 
concerned because people interested in seeing a monument preserved may not reside 
anywhere near it. It has been said that the requirement of standing tries to resolve the 
conflict between the “desirability of encouraging people to participate actively in the 
enforcement of the law” and the “undesirability of encouraging meddlesome 
interlopers invoking the jurisdiction of the courts in matters in which they are not 
concerned”.107 
The ease to which judicial review can be sought depends on whether the courts 
take a narrow or broad approach to standing. The narrow approach is exemplified by 
a U.K. case, R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Rose Theatre Trust 
Co.108 While a site in Central London was being developed, the remains of The Rose 
theatre were uncovered. This was a highly significant find as most of Christopher 
Marlowe’s plays and two of William Shakespeare’s were first staged in this Elizabethan 
theatre. To lobby for preservation of the site, a group of “persons of undoubted 
expertise and distinction”109 in archaeology, theatre, literature, and other fields, as 
well as residents and their local Member of Parliament, came together to form the Rose 
Theatre Trust Company. The company asked the Environment Secretary to protect the 
theatre by declaring it an ancient monument under the Ancient Monuments and 
Archaeological Areas Act 1979,110 but he declined. Thus, the company applied to court 
for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision not to list the theatre. 
However, the judge held that it did not have sufficient interest to bring the case. 
He said that although one does not need to have a direct financial or legal interest in a 
matter to have standing, the Act neither expressly nor impliedly gave the company a 
greater right or expectation than any other citizen to have a decision taken lawfully. 
The company would have possessed sufficient interest if the statute had, for example, 
stated that a party in its position had a legal right to require the Secretary of State to 
perform a particular duty. However, the statute did not have that effect. The judge 
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107  Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell, and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review (6th ed.) (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at 69–70, para. 2-002. 
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Lee: We Built this City: Public Participation in Land Use Decisions in Singapore … 17 
 
acknowledged it was true that if a particular individual or group was not found to have 
standing in such cases, certain administrative decisions would go unchallenged even 
if they were clearly unlawful. However, the law did not require the courts to be there 
for every individual interested in litigating the legality of an administrative decision. 
The U.K. Parliament could have given such a wide right of legal access to people, but 
had not done so.111 
Ex parte Rose Theatre Trust is no longer good law in the U.K., and is treated as 
an exceptional case by some commentators.112 Currently, British courts take a broad 
approach to standing. For instance, in R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd.,113 a divisional 
court writing in 1995 recognized that over the last 12 years judges had taken “an 
increasingly liberal approach to standing”, and was able to say that “the merits of the 
challenge are an important, if not dominant, factor when considering standing”.114 
Thus, unless a claim is entirely without merit, an applicant should not be denied 
standing simply because he or she has no stronger right than any other citizen to 
ensure that a public authority complies with the law. Otherwise, if every citizen shares 
the same interest in the matter, no one is entitled to bring a case. “[T]he real question 
is whether the applicant can show some substantial default or abuse, and not whether 
his personal rights or interests are involved”.115 
A 2014 Court of Appeal decision, though, shows that the Singapore courts have 
not eschewed the narrow approach in ex parte Rose Theatre Trust. Jeyaretnam 
Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General 116  arose out of a claim by the opposition 
politician Kenneth Jeyaretnam that the Government had infringed Article 144 of the 
Constitution by not seeking the President’s concurrence for a contingent loan of US$4 
billion it had made to the International Monetary Fund through the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore. The Court said he lacked standing to bring the case. To possess 
standing, a person must be able to allege either that a public authority has violated a 
personal or private right enjoyed by him or her; or a public right enjoyed by everyone 
in common, but that the person has suffered ‘special damage’117 – that is, damage to a 
greater extent or of a different nature compared to others.118 However, in the Court’s 
view, Jeyaretnam had brought his claim purely in the public interest, and not because 
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of any breach of a private or public right.119 While in rare cases a court might exercise 
discretion to allow someone in Jeyaretnam’s position to bring a case because an 
authority’s breach of public duty “is of sufficient gravity such that it would be in the 
public interest for the courts to hear the case”, this was not established on the facts as 
Jeyaretnam had wrongly interpreted Article 144.120 
In view of the Jeyaretnam decision, it will be hard for people to demonstrate 
they have standing to initiate judicial review proceedings in respect of monuments, 
except perhaps in cases where the relevant legal procedures have been blatantly 
contravened by the authorities. Consequently, I submit it is desirable for the 
Preservation of Monuments Act to be updated to allow interested persons other than 
owners and occupiers of monuments and adjacent land to make representations to the 
Minister. 
B. LAWS RELATING TO THE TRANSIENT USE OF PUBLIC SPACE 
It will probably come as no surprise that the transient use of public space is 
comprehensively regulated in Singapore. We will focus on using public areas for 
speeches and assemblies such as demonstrations and protests, and the two primary 
statutes controlling such activities: the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act 
[PEMA]121 and the Public Order Act [POA].122 Rather amusingly, a demonstration, 
display, or parade in a place to which the public or any class of the public has access 
whether gratuitously or otherwise is defined as a “public entertainment”, 123  even 
though it is for a serious purpose rather than for amusement. Public entertainment 
cannot be provided without a licence issued by the police.124 Following an amendment 
to the Act effected by the POA,125 lectures, talks, addresses, debates or discussions are 
not public entertainments126 and hence require no PEMA licence. 
Rather, such events are now regulated under the POA, which generally requires 
a permit to be obtained from the Commissioner of Police before any public assembly 
or public procession is held.127 An assembly is defined by the Act as meaning: 
… a gathering or meeting (whether or not comprising any lecture, talk, address, debate 
or discussion) of persons the purpose (or one of the purposes) of which is — 
(a) to demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person, 
group of persons or any government; 
(b) to publicise a cause or campaign; or 
(c) to mark or commemorate any event, 
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and includes a demonstration by a person alone for any such purpose referred to in 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c)…128 
A procession is: 
a march, parade or other procession (whether or not involving the use of vehicles or 
other conveyances) — 
(a) comprising 2 or more persons gathered at a place of assembly to move from 
that place substantially as a body of persons in succession proceeding by a 
common route or routes; and 
(b) the purpose (or one of the purposes) of which is — 
(i) to demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any 
person, group of persons or any government; 
(ii) to publicise a cause or campaign; or 
(iii) to mark or commemorate any event, 
and includes any assembly held in conjunction with such procession, and a march by a 
person alone for any such purpose referred to in paragraph (b)(i), (ii) or (iii)…129 
Public assemblies and processions in the vicinity of the Istana, Parliament House, the 
Supreme Court, the Old Supreme Court Building, City Hall, the Padang, and the State 
Courts are prohibited.130 
The Government maintains a blanket ban on, and no police permit will be 
issued for, cause-based assemblies, demonstrations, speeches and other events in 
outdoor venues, except in Speakers’ Corner in Hong Lim Park.131 For events there, no 
permit need be applied for; the only requirement is pre-registration with the 
Commissioner of Parks and Recreation132 through the National Parks Board website. 
A similar concession applies to public assemblies held inside buildings or other 
enclosed premises where the organizers and speakers are all Singapore citizens; the 
event does not deal with any matter “which relates (directly or indirectly) to any 
religious belief or religion, or any matter which may cause feelings of enmity, hatred, 
ill-will or hostility between different racial or religious groups in Singapore”; and the 
organizer or an authorized agent of the organizer is present at all times.133 
These regulations remove assemblies and processions from highly visible open-
air locations to indoor venues and to Speakers’ Corner. It has been remarked that 
“Speakers’ Corner is quite symbolic… in simultaneously preserving a literal ‘space’ for 
practicing free speech, while limiting or ‘cornering’ it in that space”, and is thus an 
“exercise in tokenism”.134 The regulations therefore detract from the right to the city 
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which, it will be recalled, includes “the right to use of the center, a privileged place”.135 
On its part, the Government has justified its policy of not permitting events to be held 
outdoors136 (except at Speakers’ Corner) on the ground that allowing demonstrations 
and protest marches to be held simultaneously with major events such as the Annual 
Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group staged in 
Singapore in September 2006 will divert law enforcement from their vital task of 
ensuring the security of the events. Furthermore, protests that begin peacefully can 
turn violent. Of particular concern are events that may cause tensions between ethnic 
groups: “The worst race riots in Singapore history began as peaceful processions. 
Hence even one such violent riot in Singapore with its attendant loss of lives, injury to 
persons, and damage to property is one incident too many. Deeper than the physical 
damage are the scarred relations between communal groups and the erosion of the 
sense of order and security which Singaporeans value and cherish.”137 In August 2014, 
a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (‘LGBT’) pride event called the Pink Run to 
be held at the Marina Promenade Park was denied a permit on the ground that LGBT 
advocacy “remains a socially divisive issue”; the applicant was advised to have the 
event at Speakers’ Corner. A permit for a similar event had also been turned down in 
2007. Responding to media queries, the police said that Speakers’ Corner “is the 
designated public place for such activities, to avoid inconveniencing the general public, 
or leading to contention or potential public order issues”.138 One wonders, though, 
whether such a constant distrust of Singaporeans deprives them of the opportunity to 
mature as a society and to show they can express their views without causing mayhem. 
The regulatory scheme established by the POA has not yet been subject to 
constitutional challenge, but it seems unlikely that one would succeed as the PEMA 
has been determined not to violate the right to freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed to citizens by Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution.139 This right, and the 
right to freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 14(1)(b), are subject to the 
limitations expressed in Article 14(2): 
Parliament may by law impose — 
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and 
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restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide 
against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence; 
(b) on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof or public order… 
In Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs,140 the High Court stated obiter that 
the term necessary or expedient confers upon Parliament “an extremely wide 
discretionary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach 
towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution”. Since 
Article 14(2) does not mention that the restrictions that Parliament may impose have 
to be reasonable, the court need not apply any balancing or proportionality test to 
ensure that the rights protected by Article 14(1) have not been excessively curtailed in 
pursuance of some other public interest. The court’s only task is to establish is a nexus 
between the object of the restrictive law in question and one of the permissible subjects 
stipulated in Article 14(2).141 Based on this reasoning, the PEMA and POA are no doubt 
justifiable as restrictions on the rights to free speech and assembly in the interest of 
public order. Such a constricted interpretation of Article 14(2) leaves little space for 
the courts to uphold these fundamental liberties, as Parliament essentially has a free 
hand to enact restrictive legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
Soja’s concept of spatial justice is closely related to Lefebvre’s right to the city, which 
asserts the right of city dwellers to have a say in “the space and time of their activities 
in the urban area” as well as “the right to use of the center” of the city.142 The use of the 
term right appears to link spatial justice to the idea of human rights, but it is submitted 
that spatial justice is a concept more philosophical than legal. Nonetheless, it is useful 
as a yardstick against which the degree of public participation in land use decisions in 
Singapore can be measured. 
Where laws regulating the built environment are concerned, the Planning Act 
expressly allows for public participation at a macro level, as there exists a procedure 
for views of members of the public to be sought on proposed amendments to the 
Master Plan, though doubts about the procedure’s effectiveness exist. The non-
statutory practice of drawing up Concept Plans also features extensive public 
consultation. However, at the micro level, when decisions are made about whether 
development work should be approved, the legislation is silent on participation by 
persons other than the applicants themselves. Similarly, under the Preservation of 
Monuments Act, the only persons who need to be notified about an intention for a site 
to be declared a national monument are the owners and occupiers of the monument 
and adjacent land. A decision by the Government to compulsorily acquire private land 
for public purposes is only challengeable on the ground of bad faith, which is difficult 
to prove. Nonetheless, the fact that compensation payable for acquisitions is now 
pegged at the market rate, and the practice of granting additional ex gratia payments 
and covering removal and relocation expenses in appropriate cases, arguably relieves 
much of the hardship caused. 
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Interested persons who are not directly affected by such governmental 
decisions must therefore seek a remedy in administrative or constitutional law by 
initiating proceedings in the High Court for judicial review of the decisions. Here, they 
face several difficulties: the need to establish that they have standing to sue, and to 
prove that the relevant public authority has breached one or more administrative law 
rules. Fairly narrow interpretations of Articles 9(1), 12(1) and 14 of the Constitution by 
the courts thus far mean that the prospects of successfully demonstrating the 
unconstitutionality of the decisions in question are also slight. The same is true of 
legislation regulating the transient use of public space such as the Public 
Entertainments and Meetings Act and Public Order Act, and refusals by the 
authorities to issue licences and permits under these Acts for assemblies and 
processions to be held in outdoor venues. Thus it may be that the true utility of spatial 
justice is as a rallying point to encourage grassroots and community groups to effect 
change through the political process by calling for modifications to laws and policies. 
 
